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ABSTRACT 
Nowadays, people often have to input information on public 
terminals. By doing so, they might disclose information to 
strangers looking over their shoulders. In this paper we introduce 
a new way of interacting with public terminals, which offers more 
privacy by using a personal mobile device to enter private data. It 
allows the users to choose which information is to be regarded 
personal, which can then be entered on their mobile device and is 
hidden from the screen accordingly. Furthermore we created a 
prototype and conducted a user study measuring users’ input 
performance and to collect opinions about the system’s usability 
and practical value. The paper concludes with some ideas to make 
the system even more useful. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.5.2 [Information interfaces and presentation (e.g. HCI)]: 
User Interfaces – Input devices and strategies, evaluation. 
General Terms 
Security, Human Factors, Theory, Verification. 
Keywords 
Privacy, mobile devices, public terminals, personal data. 
1.  PRIVATE PUBLIC INTERACTION 
Interacting with services using public terminals is a common task 
these days. Services are for instance train ticket vending 
machines, public information screens, ATMs, Internet terminals, 
etcetera. Besides their manifold advantages – like big displays 
and enhanced input capabilities (touch-screens, keyboards, etc.) – 
that ease the users’ life, public terminals comprise several privacy 
as well as security risks. 
Whenever users are required to input personal information, this 
can be easily exploited by attackers. A simple and very common 
attack is the so-called shoulder surfing. It can either be performed 
non-technically by trying to spy on the input from a close spot or 
technically by using cameras or other equipment targeted at the 
display or the input device. Due to the size of public terminals 
and displays, this attack becomes highly efficient and is for 
instance commonly used in ATM frauds [9]. 
In this paper, an interaction technique called PocketPIN will be 
introduced, which has been created to enable private input on 
public terminals using mobile devices. The idea is to split up the 
user interface and input functionality between the terminal and 
the mobile device, which is supported by results from [6] which 
show that in public (non-private) spaces, users like privacy-
respectful division of information and interfaces mostly to 
balance privacy (mobile device) with better I/O (terminal). This 
assumption is confirmed by the results of the user study, which 
will be outlined in more detail in the second part of this paper. 
2.  POCKETPIN CONCEPT 
The basic concept of PocketPIN is to utilize the users’ personal 
mobile equipment (mobile phones, PDAs etc.) as an input device 
for public terminals. Mobile devices mostly are more private and 
secure than terminals. Firstly, they are owned and carried around 
by the users. Thus, it is hard or next to impossible for an attacker 
to manipulate them. Secondly, their keypads are small and not 
fixed to a specific location (in contrast to an ATM keypad for 
instance) and thus hard to spy on. Users can take extra 
precautions for further security, like keeping the mobile device in 
a bag or pocket (Pocket Private Input – PocketPIN) to enter data. 
2.1  Basics 
When creating a system that is supposed to provide private input 
in public, several aspects have to be considered. First of all, 
privacy cannot be defined by a system but only by its users. The 
personal definition of privacy varies from person to person. Some 
consider all their personal data private while others are only 
worried about data like their bank or health information. 
Therefore, an input system for personal data has to be adjustable 
to the personal requirements of different users. The PocketPIN 
system addresses this problem by providing a privacy setting 
interaction by marking specific input fields as private. 
Another aspect of such a system is its usability. Since users have 
to interact with a huge variety of services with their mobile 
devices, consistency and simplicity are highly important. 
Additionally, PocketPIN compatible terminals have to provide a 
non-private mode as well, since there are still a non-marginal 
number of persons that do not own a mobile device. Therefore, 
terminals should work as usual and switch to a private/secure 
mode if a PocketPIN compatible device is connected to them. 
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2.2  Interaction Flow 
The PocketPIN interaction with the terminal consists of six steps 
as outlined in Figure 1: 
1. To start the private input session with a public terminal, the 
user needs to establish a secure communication channel between  NordiCHI 2008: Using Bridges, 18-22 October , Lund, Sweden. 
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 the device and the terminal, which tells the terminal to switch to 
private mode. A solution using visual markers as proposed in [2] 
will be explained in the next section. 
2. The terminal sends its data requirements to the mobile device. 
This mainly consists of a description of personal data required 
from the user. 
3. The user selects private input fields on the terminal screen. 
Alternatively (e.g. if the terminal lacks appropriate input 
mechanisms) the private fields can be selected and marked 
directly on the mobile device. 
4. With respect to the user’s choice, the mobile device creates the 
user interface for the required data. The terminal additionally 
adapts its UI so that all the private information is hidden and 
private fields are marked as such. 
5. The user enters the personal data (partially at the mobile 
device, partially at the terminal). The only feedback on the 
terminal side are asterisks for filled out fields. 
 
Figure 1: PocketPIN Interaction Flow 
2.3  Ad-Hoc Privacy Preferences 
In [6], Hutchings et al. state that interface allocation and division 
of information should be changeable by the users during runtime. 
This process should be easy and quick. 
The ad-hoc privacy settings of PocketPIN follow this suggestion. 
The selection of private input fields was realized by placing 
checkboxes next to the fields on the terminal screen as shown in 
Figure 2 (left). When checked, the respective field is marked as 
private. Additionally, a selection menu for the fields has been 
implemented on the mobile device, which can be seen in Figure 2 
(right). This menu is created dynamically after the data 
requirements have been sent by the terminal (see Figure 1, step 2). 
After the user has chosen the private input fields, the mobile 
phone and the terminal create the respective input forms. On the 
terminal side, the form is shown with all input fields for personal 
data, the private fields are grayed out. On the phone, a form only 
consisting of the private fields is shown. This decision has been 
taken due to the limited screen size of mobile devices. There is a 
slight danger that users may be confused by such an approach, but 
we hope this is not the case. This had to be clarified in the user 
study. Whenever a field is filled out, its content is masked with 
asterisks on the terminal to give visual feedback to the user that 
the data has been successfully submitted. This approach is 
illustrated in steps 4 and 5 in Figure 1. 
   
Figure 2: Interaction with the prototype (left) and selection of 
private input fields using the mobile phone (right) 
3.  PROTOTYPE 
A mobile phone JavaME prototype and a JavaSE server 
application have been implemented to evaluate PocketPIN. To 
establish a secure connection between the phone and the server, 
an approach based on the visual marker connection proposed by 
Claycomb et al. in [2] has been used. When users want to create a 
connection to the terminal, they take a photo of a visual marker 
displayed on the screen (QRCode [4]). The marker is decoded and 
information like the Bluetooth address etcetera to create the 
secure connection are extracted from it. For further information 
please refer to [2]. This method has been chosen for its simplicity, 
effciency, and ease of deployment. Nevertheless, any other secure 
ad-hoc connection technique could be used as well. For 
communication, open source libraries have been used: 
implementations of MD5 [1] (for the public key hash) as well as 
RSA and OAEP (for encrypting communication from the client to 
the server). Markers are decoded using the Google ZXing API [5]. 
To create them, the encoder from [12] was ported to Java. 
4.  EVALUATION 
To evaluate PocketPIN, a large screen in the hallway of the 
university, usually a public information terminal for students has 
been chosen. This screen was extended with a mouse and a 
keyboard. The location seemed appropriate since it is private 
enough to be controlled by the testers to avoid interruptions by 
by-passers and the like. The mobile PocketPIN software was 
installed on a Nokia N73. 
The goal of the study was to compare PocketPIN to a privacy-less 
interaction mode as well as a privacy-enforcing interaction mode 
with the assumption that PocketPIN provides an appropriate 
balance between privacy and usability, which is a major feature of 
divisible interfaces as stated by Hutchings et al. in [6]. 
4.1  User Study Design 
For the usability evaluation, an intra-subject factorial design has 
been chosen. The independent variable in the study was privacy 
mode with three possible levels: 1. All data has to be entered 
without obfuscation at the terminal (no privacy). 2. All data has to 
be entered using the mobile phone (full privacy). 3. The users can 
choose private data fields using the mobile phone selection tool or 
the terminal selection (the actual PocketPIN prototype). The task 
for each experimental condition was to fill out a form containing 
first name, last name, e-mail address and credit card number. Performing this task in condition one (no privacy) acted as the 
control condition to compare the results of the study. 
The dependent variables measured in the experiment were task 
completion time, user satisfaction and experienced privacy. The 
order of the three experimental conditions (filling out the form in 
each level of the independent variable) was uniformly distributed 
over the participants to minimize learning and ordering effects. 
4.2  Hypotheses 
Based on the expected outcome of the experiment, hypotheses 
were formulated: (H1) Filling out the form using the privacy-less 
mode will be faster than using PocketPIN and full privacy mode. 
(H2) The participants will feel more private (secure), when using 
PocketPIN than using the terminal only version. (H3) PocketPIN 
is an appropriate trade-off between privacy und usability. 
4.3  Participants 
The study was conducted with twelve participants with an average 
age of 25 years, four of them female and eight male. The 
youngest participant was 21, the oldest 31 years old. All own a 
mobile phone and rate their experience handling it as high. 
Choosing twelve participants allowed to have the order of the 
experimental conditions evenly distributed amongst the 
participants (3 privacy mode levels result in 6 possible orders). 
4.4  Procedure 
At the beginning, the prototype was explained to the participants 
and they were allowed to gather initial experience with the 
interaction until they felt familiar with it. As mentioned before, 
every participant had to perform the same task (filling out the 
form) in each level of the privacy mode. That is, each participant 
had to fill out the same form three times. A short explanation was 
given and the subjects were instructed to fill the form with real 
data and to try to perform the task as fast as possible. The 
completion times for the different conditions were measured 
without the participants’ knowledge. After each condition, a short 
questionnaire collecting demographic data had to be filled out. 
This should provide a deletion of the short-term memory as well 
as to give the participants a short relaxation time. After the final 
condition, additional questions collecting the participants’ 
opinions were asked in a final questionnaire. Likert scales from 1 
(“don’t agree”) to 5 (“highly agree”) were used. 
4.5  Results 
4.5.1  Performance 
As expected, filling out the form using the privacy-less mode was 
the fastest input method (Figure 3) with a mean of 21.8s (sd: 7.7s) 
compared to full privacy mode (mean: 63.3s; sd: 19s) and 
PocketPIN (mean: 74.25; sd: 28s). A statistical analysis using 
ANOVA shows that this result is highly significant (F2,22=37.146, 
p<.001). Bonferroni post hoc tests reveal significant differences 
between privacy-less compared to PocketPIN (CI.95 = -73.85 
(lower) – 30.99 (upper), p<.001) and privacy-less compared to 
full privacy (CI.95 = -55.04 (lower) – 27.96 (upper), p<.001). 
These results correlate with the opinion of the participants, rating 
privacy-less the fastest with 4.7, full private 3.0 and PocketPIN 
3.4, and confirms hypothesis H1. 
Interestingly, regardless of how many fields were chosen as 
private by the participants using PocketPIN, full privacy mode 
and PocketPIN had no significant difference in input speed 
(p>.05). Every participant that started with PocketPIN performed 
faster in full privacy mode and vice versa. The learning effect and 
the short form can explain this. Thus the attention shift between 
screen and mobile phone could be too long compared to the 
advantage gained by the terminal input. 
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Figure 3: Input times of the three different input methods 
4.5.2  User Satisfaction 
Regarding ease of use, it was expected that all participants would 
be able to interact with the prototype without major problems, 
which has been the case. All three methods were rated easy to use 
of which the privacy-less version was rated easiest to use (4.8) 
followed by the PocketPIN (3.9) and the full private input (3.3). 
Non-parametric statistic analysis shows significance for these 
results (χ
2(2) = 11.81, p<.003). Post-hoc Wilcoxon tests 
(Bonferroni correct level of significance .0167) show that only the 
difference in opinion between privacy-less mode and full privacy 
mode is significant (T = 0, p<.0167, r=-.55). There is neither a 
significant difference between privacy-less and PocketPIN (T = 2, 
ns, r=-.42) nor between full privacy and PocketPIN (T = 2, ns, r=-
.37). The interesting part is that the difference in the rating of 
PocketPIN and privacy-less (terminal only) version was not 
significant. This allows assumptions that PocketPIN is not 
considered harder to use than privacy-less mode, which could be 
due to the possibility to enter complex, non-private data directly 
at the terminal. 
As stated before, the design decision was made to show only the 
private input fields. During the study, 10 out of the 12 participants 
reported that they would prefer to see (and maybe enter) all input 
fields on the mobile device. This again could be due to the fact 
that the form only consisted of four fields, which is supported by 
the very interesting statement of one user: “Actually, it depends 
on how long the form is. If it is short enough to fit on the display, 
I'd rather see all input fields. If the form is very long and only few 
input fields are private, I'd rather see only the private ones”. This 
will be taken into consideration in future work. 
4.5.3  Privacy 
Regarding privacy, the most important aspect of this work, the 
privacy-less mode was rated worse (1.8) than full privacy mode 
(4.3) and PocketPIN (3.7), which could be shown to be significant 
(χ
2(2) = 13.61, p<.001). Post-hoc Wilcoxon tests with a 
Bonferroni corrected level of significance .0167 showed that the 
differences in the experienced privacy between privacy-less and 
PocketPIN (T = 2, p<.0167, r=-.57) and full privacy mode (T = 1, 
p<.0167, r=-.59) are significant but no significance between the 
two privacy enabled modes could be shown (T = 4, ns, r=-.043). 
These results support hypothesis H2. When analyzing the answers regarding the privacy features of the 
system, it was interesting to see that no preference regarding the 
privacy selection method could be found. Two participants 
preferred to define private input fields using the terminal, four 
using the mobile phone and six said they prefer having the 
combination of both. This result is confirmed by the observation 
of the study that seven people used the terminal to define the 
private input fields and five used the mobile phone. Interestingly, 
even though six participants would prefer the combination of 
both, none of the 12 participants switched between the modes to 
select input fields. That is, for those six it already seems sufficient 
to have the possibility to choose the appropriate mode. 
4.5.4  Discussion 
The major idea of this work was that PocketPIN is a reasonable 
trade-off between privacy and ease-of-use. The results of the 
evaluation support this assumption. PocketPIN was considered 
more private than the privacy-less mode but not less private than 
the full privacy mode (thus secure enough). Regarding ease of 
use, opinions did not significantly differ between PocketPIN and 
privacy-less mode, whereas for privacy-less and full privacy 
mode it did. Nevertheless, PocketPIN took longer for filling out 
the form than privacy-less mode, which could be shown to be 
significant. Even though slightly slower interaction is acceptable 
for privacy-preserving technologies, it can only be argued that 
hypothesis (H3) could be partially confirmed. It is expected that 
PocketPIN will perform better with longer forms, which should be 
investigated in future studies to see if (H3) can be fully validated. 
5.  RELATED WORK 
Private interaction in public has been a topic in research for some 
time. Most focus on secure and private authentication in public. 
For instance, Kumar et al. [7] evaluated a prototype for shoulder-
surfing resistant password entry using eye-gaze interaction. That 
is, PINs and passwords are entered with the eyes instead of 
manual input. This way, attackers have fewer chances to spy on it. 
The problems of this approach are the slow interaction time and 
calibration issues. Tan et al. [11] created an input system for 
touch screens that is secure to human spies due to highly 
increased complexity of the input. Video surveillance attacks still 
work fine. Additionally, the input time of password entry is 
considerably prolonged. While the above mentioned authors 
focused on increasing the security of traditional password/PIN, 
others evaluated alternative authentication systems on public 
terminals like graphical passwords by Moncur et al. [8] or 
biometric authentication as done by Coventry et al [3]. 
Sharp et al. [10] created a system that enables private input and 
output using PDAs. Users can censor complete displays of 
terminals and use their PDA to show cut-outs of the screen to read 
or fill in private data. Its main focus is to operate with any 
desktop program without modification. Thus, a lot of interaction 
time is needed to navigate through the screen to find the right 
spot. Additionally, it requires mobile devices with advanced 
processing and output capabilities (e.g. a big screen). In contrast 
to that, PocketPIN focuses on fast, easy and private ad-hoc 
interaction with public terminals suitable for any mobile device. 
6.  FUTURE WORK 
The results of the study and participants’ comments showed some 
interesting enhancements for PocketPIN that should be addressed 
in future work. For instance, doing privacy settings at the 
beginning of each interaction seems too redundant. Instead, the 
device could store privacy preferences or remember terminals and 
thus perform step 3 automatically. The same approach can be 
used to fill out forms automatically as known from modern web 
browsers to speed up the interaction with the terminal. 
Another possible extension is a finer definition of the degree of 
privacy. So far, only two options are supported for each input 
field: private (input at the mobile device with asterisks on the 
terminal screen) and public (input at the terminal, visible to 
everyone). A finer granularity might be desirable. Thus, four 
levels of privacy for each input field could be applied.  The first 
means zero privacy and will show the input on the terminal. The 
second will show asterisks on the terminal screen but plain text on 
the device. The third displays asterisks on both, while the last 
hides all information from the screen. It is to be shown whether 
users will benefit from this extension or if it creates a cognitive 
overload and results in worse usability. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented PocketPIN, a privacy respectful input 
method for public terminals utilizing mobile devices. Choosing a 
system that lets users define their own privacy, the concept forms 
an appropriate trade-off between direct input at terminals, which 
is fast but insecure and completely private input that 
unnecessarily complicates interaction when dealing with 
information that is unimportant to the users. In a user study it 
could be shown that the participants accepted the idea very well 
and no major problems could be found throughout the interaction. 
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